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COMPONENT PARTS AND RAW MATERIALS SELLERS:
FROM THE TITANIC TO THE NEW,RESTATEMENT

by M Stuart Madden'
ABSTRACT
Professor Madden evaluates the treatment of potential design and
informational obligation liability for raw materials and component parts
manufacturers under the Products Liability Restatement. Following an
introduction to the approach taken under the Restatement (Second) of
Torts: Products Liability, and the congruent approach of the new the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (hereinafter Third
Restatement), the author evaluates the Third Restatement and the limited
number of decisions that have employed it. Further to the goal of
evaluating the bona fides of the Third Restatement rule, the author
describes the two principal approaches to modem Tort law. The first
approach is the venerable correctivejustice-morality model. The second
model is that of economic efficiency-deterrence. Professor Madden
concludes that the Third Restatement's synthesis in terms of warnings and
design duties of raw materials or component parts suppliers proves up
favorably under either construct, and that as respects these somewhat
commingled issues represents a valuable contributionto Products Liability
law.
Copyright 1999, M. Stuart Madden

1. Professor Madden is Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor and Distinguished
Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, New York.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that the powers of Madison Avenue have at last
persuaded you that you really would rather have a Buick. You buy one,
and before the odometer registers 2000 miles, at a bend in the road and at a
normal speed, the axle breaks. Your Buick stutters to a stop and you find
yourselfas a stimulus for a multi-car chain collision.
From your lap top modem at your hospital bed, you learn that the
axle, part of Buick's original equipment, was manufactured not by General
Motors, but by Acme Metal Works, a small but reputable manufacturer of
axles for several automobile manufacturers. Your attorney, a graduate of
the Salmon P. Chase School of Law, suggests that you bring a suit against
Acme, since it appears that they manufactured an axle that was flawed in
the manufacturingor inspection process, or was improperly designed. She
suggests further that you sue Buick. You ask: "Why Buick?'The
response is twofold. First, if the bank robber Willie Sutton had been a
plaintiff's lawyer, he might say: "Because that's where the money is."
Buick is solvent, and is not likely to repatriate to a foreign country during
the pendency of the suit. Second, and in an insight that fills attorneys with
a sense of deja vu, or more specifically a recollection of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.? you remember that if the overall product is marketed as
a Buick, and if buyers have the reasonable perception that they are buying
a Buick, then Buick has a nondelegableduty to sell a duly safe vehicle?
In a new scenario, a middle-aged man has suffered bone damage
to his jaw. His surgeon informs him that all or most of his condition can
be eliminated by implantation of a temporomandibularjoint (TMJ), made
of Teflon (TM). Teflon is a proprietary product of E.I. DuPont de
NeMours. Such joints are manufactured by a company named Vitek.
DuPont sells its product in bulk to a large number of purchasers, who use
it for a multitude of purposes. While DuPont knows of many applications
of its product, such as the popular cooking device coating, it neither knows
of, nor does it take steps to inquire as to, the universe of Teflon's potential
uses or misuses.
DuPont does know that Teflon has not been approved as safe for
application in Type I11 medical devices, and the literature accompanying
2. 1 I I N.E.1050 (N.Y.1916).
3. See id at 1053.
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its sale makes no representation as to its suitability for such use. When
Teflon is found to be unsuitable for human implantation, should DuPont
be liable in products liability?4
A manufacturer sells truck chassis to which downstream
assemblers will thereafter affix commercial truck bodies, ranging from
beverage truck bodies to garbage truck bodies. Query: Is the component
part manufacturer of the rear-view windows for such chassis charged with
a duty to anticipate, and design for, rear vision mirrors suited to all
potential uses?'
A final hypothetical is based upon the venerable Cub Scout
Pinewood Derby competition. The miniature pine cars, fashioned by Cub
Scouts and their moms or dads, formerly were accompanied by miniature
driver figurines, approximatelyLEG0 (TM)sized. The assembly kit now
announces that the driver figurines are no longer included. Perhaps the
reason for the change is that the driver figurines posed a small parts
hazard. Query: Would the driver figurine manufacturer have warnings or
design duties regarding the inclusion of its otherwise non-defective
stamped plastic figurines sold as a component part of a hobby kit
principally manufactured by, and sold under the name of, the Pinewood
Derby trademark?

4. See M. Stuart~Madden, Liability of Suppliers of Natural Raw Materials and the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability - A First Step Toward Sound Public Policy,
30 U . Ma.L. REV. 281,305 (1997).
5. According to Zma v. Marquess & Nell, Inc. 675 A.2d 620, 628 (N.J. 1996) (citations
omitted):
[Tlhe fabricator of a component part that is not inherently dangerous
has no control over whether the purchaser properly installs the
component part into the final system. Where a finished product is the
result of work by more than one party, a court must examine at what
stage installation of safety devices is feasible and practicable. In many
jurisdictions, responsibility for installing a safety device is determined
by reference to three criteria: (1) the trade custom indicating the party
that normally would install the safety device; (2) the relative expertise
of the parties, looking to which party is best acquainted with the design
problems and safety techniques in question; and (3) practicality,
focusing' on the stage at which installation of the device is most
feasible.
For a suggested answer, see Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 582 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978), in
which the court found not feasible the installation of safety devices by the competent
manufacturer.
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THE RESTATEMENT(SEC0ND) OF TORTS SECTION 402A
TREATMENT OF COMPONENTPARTS AND RAW MATERIALS
SELLERS' DUTIES
A.

Generally

Component parts, raw materials and ingredients, and the
responsibilities of sellers of such products, have long been treated as a
special subcategory in products liability. The rationale has consistently
been that component parts, raw materials, or ingredients enjoy one more,
or all of these qualities that differentiate them from ordinary consumer
products:
(1) They often do not reach the final vendee or user in a form
substantially unchanged and do not deserve strict products
liability treatment under RE~~ATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS
LIABILITY(hereinafter Second Restatement) Section
402~;~
(2) The upstream supplier may in fact have sold a duly safe and
perfectly merchantable product that only thereafter, by dint of
design, formulation, application, warnings or other initiatives
taken by others, became a part of a defective end p r ~ d u c t ; ~
(3) The component part, raw materials or ingredient supplier
often has no practical or efficient means of overseeing the use of
its product by a large population of vendees, and thus cannot
reasonably be expected to either foresee all potential hazards
6. The court in Zaza held that
[a] further requirement for the imposition of strict liability on a
:
component part fabricator is that the component part reach the user
without substantial change. Where a component part is subject to
further processing, or where the causing of the injury is not directly
attributable to any defect in the component part, the fabricator is
typically not subject to strict liability.
675 A.2d at 629 (citations omitted).
7. Commenting upon the implications of an alternative rule, the Third Restatement section
5, comment (a) states in part: "[if] the component is not itself defective, it would be unjust
and inefficient to impose liability solely on the ground that the manufacturer of the
integrated product utilized the component in a manner that renders the integrated product
PRODUCIS
LIABILITY
5 5 cmt. a (1998).
defective." RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF TORTS:
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inhering in various finished products, nor take steps to remedy
those flaws;'
(4) With regard to raw materials and design duties at the least,
absent adulteration or another production defect: there is no such
thing as a misdesigned raw material, i.e., sand is sand,
hydrochloric acid is hydrochloricacid;''
(5) Even without recourse against the component manufacturer,
the injured party may proceed against the ultimate fabricator;"
and
(6) It is the downstream fabricator whom we want to encourage
to pursue risk reducing manufacturing decisions," and who can
most readily and inexpensively detect and remedy avoidable
product risks."
8. The Third Restatement explains that "[i]mposing liability would require the component
seller to scrutinize another's product which the component seller has no role in developing.
This would require the component seller to develop sufficient sophistication to review the
decisions of a business entity that is already charged with responsibility for the integrated
product." Id.
9. One example occurred when sheet steel with an unacceptable level of internal
imperfections was rendered brittle and unsuitable for fabrication into automobile radiator
fan blades. See Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972).
10. "Regarding the seller's exposure to liability for defective design, a basic raw material
such as sand, gravel, or kerosene cannot be defectively designed. Inappropriate decisions
regarding the use of such materials are not attributable to the supplier of the raw materials
but rather to the fabricator who puts them to improper use." RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF
TORTS:PRODUCTSL I A B I L§~5 cmt. c (1998).
11. Comment e to the Third Restatement notes that it is the final fabricator that makes the
germane safety-related "decisions" regarding the final product, and it is that fabricator that is
"the business entity that is already charged with responsibility for the integrated product."
Id 8 5 cmt. a
12. See id. 8 5 cmt. a
13. Regarding raw materials integrated into other products, the Third Restatement explains
that:
The manufacturer of the integrated product has a significant
comparative advantage regarding selection of materials to be used.
Accordingly, raw-materials sellers are not subject to liability for harm
caused by defective design of the end-product.
The same
considerations apply to failure-to-warn claims against sellers of raw
materials. To impose a duty to warn would require the seller to
develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end-products and
to investigate the actual use of raw materials by manufacturers over
whom the seller has no control. Courts uniformly refuse to impose
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The American Law Institute's (hereinafter ALI) effort to
accommodate this cluster of practical considerations is set out at section 5
to the Third Restatement. Contemplating component parts, raw materials
and product ingredients, that section provides:
$ 5. Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor of
Product Components for Harm Caused by Products Into
Which ComponentsAre Integrated
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise
distributing product components who sells or distributes a
component is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by a product into which the component is
integrated if
(a) the component is defective in itself, as defined in this
Chapter, and the defect causes the harm; or
(b)(l) the seller or distributor of the component
substantially participates in the integration of the
component into the design of the product; and
(2) the integration of the component causes the product
to be defective, as defined in this Chapter; and
(3) the defect in the product causes the harm.I4
My goal in this essay is to examine both the premises of this new
provision, and also to gauge preliminarily whether the Third Restatement
section 5 conduces to identified tort objectives that have achieved greater
or lesser following over the years. The doctrinal objectives that I have
sketched out are these:
1.

Reduction in Avoidable Accident Costs

Principal goals of accident law are the deterrence of harmful
conduct and the encouragement of beneficial conduct. An accident law
rule that provides in some measure both deterrence of risk-creating
behavior and incentives for the actor to take affirmative steps to reduce
such an onerous duty to warn.
Id. $ 5 cmt. c.
14. Id. $5.
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avoidable accident advancesthese twin objectives.

2.

Cost Spreading

A premise of accident law liability rules is that a seller will be
able to liquidate a fairly predictable loss future into a dollar amount that it
will pay for third-party liability insurance.'' The cost of such insurance,
and other internal costs of liability defense, will therefore be spread among
consumers of the subject product in the form of higher consumer prices.16
An optimal liability rule will permit an insured to meet with its insurance
carrier and describe with some particularity its potential future liability
exposure. In contrast, an accident law rule that leaves a seller with
indeterminateliability underminesthe objective of cost spreading.

3.

Justice

A general rule imposing joint liability upon component suppliers
and final fabricators alike for the sale of defective finished products
would, one acknowledges, achieve certain efficiencies in judicial
administration. However, whatever the efficiency gains of such a rule,
they would be dwarfed by various practical considerations. In this setting,
a joint liability rule would be oblivious to tort considerationsofjustice.
A tort rule that achieves the zenith of efficiency but which
disregardsjustice or practical consequences will be rejected as irrational,
otherwise wasteful, or, as the comments to the Second and Third
Restatements suggest, both." Omnibus component or raw material seller
liability would be unjust as it would impose an irrational burden upon
sellers to superintend, which is to say, to be hall monitors, regarding
myriad potential downstream applications of their otherwise non-defective
products.18 Such a burden would, it is seen, impose social costs, in the
form of elevated product costs, or even total unavailability of valuable
15. See Steven W. Pottier & Robert C. Witt, On the Demand for Liability Insurance: An
Insurance Economics Perspective, 72 TEX.L. REV. 1681, 1684 (1993).
16. Should accident incidence or other factors make it infeasible to transfer insurance costs
to consumers, or render insurance unavailable, the actor must necessarily evaluate the
practicality of continuing the conduct, i.e., in the current context, the manufacture and sale
of products.
17. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)
OF TORTS:PRODUCTSLIABILITY
4 5 (1998).
18. Id. 4 5 cmt. a.
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products, that would occlude whatever deterrence attributes
administrativeefficienciesthat might be achieved.I9
4.

or

Reasonable Foreseeability

Within the shortest period of time, it now seems in retrospect, the
so-called "strict liability" standard of the Second Restatement section
402A was pulled back into the gravitational field of the reasonableness
standards of negligence." Applying such a standard of reasonableness
and reasonable foreseeability to a component seller's design and warning
obligations does not, proponents of the Third Restatement rule might say,
place a premium on ignorance." No modern accident law rules create
incentives for ignorance. Rather, limitations on liability for component,
raw materials and ingredient sellers simply and clearly recognize
important distinctions between the component supplier's role and that of
the final fabricator." A manufacturer remains responsible for being an
expert in the field of the pertinent manufacturing endea~or.'~ A chair
manufacturer is presumed to be an expert in the load strength and
ergonomics of a duly safe chair, in both its intended use (sitting) and, at
least with regard to load strength, a reasonably forseeable "off label" use
such as to support a person attempting to replace a light bulb.
Likewise, a seller of sand is held to the standard of an expert in the
production of sand. We might suppose that such responsibilitywould run
to such matters as making certain that your playground sand did not
contain any dangerous level of adulteration, such as mineral radium or
chrysotile asbestos. The sand seller is not expected to be an expert in the
use of its product in the manufacture of glass since there are no
identifiable perimeters around the potential end users of sand, or for that
matter teflon, silicon, sheet metal or pig iron. Thus, a "reasonable
19. See id. $ 2 cmt. a
20. Consistent therewith, under the Third Restatement, only manufacturing defects are
evaluated under a truly strict liability standard. Design and informational obligations are
based upon reasonableness and foreseeability. Id. $ 1 cmt. a.
21. See id. $ 1 cmt. a
22. See id.
23. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Inc., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1976); Olson v.
Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994); Stahlheber v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 451
S.W.2d 48, 61 (Mo. 1970). See also DAVIDG . OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITYAND
SAFETY73 n.6 (3d ed. 1996).
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foreseeability" predicate to the component seller's design or warning
duties will, in the majority of circumstances, preclude a finding of
liability.24

B.

Section 402A 's Strategic and Successfil Distortion of the
Standardsfor a ConventionalRestatement

The objective of the Third Restatement, in keeping ALI~'
tradition, is not to reform the law, but rather to rationalize it. It does so by
reconciling to the extent possible conflicting state standards and creating a
unified presentation of products liability law that might prompt a state
high court in a jurisdiction that had not ruled on the matter to adopt the
ThirdRestatement position as the optimal rule of law.26
The Second Restatement section 402A, published in 1965, was
more of a law reform initiative than a typical Restatement. Nevertheless, it
became enormously influential because (a) at the time of its publication,
Products Liability law was a substantially incoherent welter of divergent
and (b) section 402A gave language that
voices, a Tower of ~abe1;~'
courts could understand, at least initially.

C.

The Decisional Law Under Section 402A

1.

Generally

Neither the Second Restatement section 402A nor its successor,
Third Restatement, affect liability for the truly defective component part.
24. A liability prerequisite of reasonable foreseeability is therefore essential (1)
preservation of incentives for reasonable user caution; (2) for harmonization with riskfutility
analysis employed elsewhere in personal injury law, and in products liability law
particularly; (3) as the cornerstone for judicious identification of substandard conduct; (4) is
central to optimal evaluation of economic efficiency; and (5) is necessary to any reasonable
expectation that tort rules will encourage beneficial conduct and deter wasteful or harmful
conduct.
25. The American Law Institute is a private body of judges, practicing attorneys, and legal
scholars that drafts and publishes the Restatements of various fields of the law.
26. C/:AMERICANLAW INS^, THIS IS THEAMERICANLAW INSITIUTE1-4 (1996)
(describing ALI's purpose, operations, and membership).
27. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 461 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring),
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In comment p to the SecondRestatement section 402A, the ALI states:
It seems reasonably clear that the mere fact that the
product is to undergo processing, or other substantial
change, will not in all cases relieve the seller of liability
under the rule stated in this Section. If, for example, raw
coffee beans are sold to a buyer who roasts and packs
them for sale to the ultimate consumer, it cannot be
supposed that the seller will be relieved of all liability
when the raw beans are contaminated with arsenic, or
some other poison . . . . On the other hand, the
manufacturer of pigiron, which is capable of a wide
variety of uses, is not so likely to be held to strict liability
when it turns out to be unsuitable for the child's tricycle
into which it is finally made by a remote buyer.28
A harmonious note is added in the Third Restatement where the
ALI confirms:
[I]f a cut-off switch is sold in a defective condition due to
loosely connected wiring, the seller of the switch is
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused
by the improper wiring after the switch is integrated into
another product. Similarly, if aluminum that departs from
the aluminum manufacturer's specifications due to the
presence of foreign particles is utilized in the manufacture
of airplane engines, the seller of the defective aluminum
is subject to liability for harm to persons to persons or
property caused by the defects in the aluminum.29
Putting aside circumstances in which the component, raw
material, or ingredient is defective, under the Second Restatement section
402A a component seller's warning duties extend only to such risks as
were foreseeable at the time of the seller's initial introduction of the
product into commerce.30 Where such risks are foreseeable, the decisions
28. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
8 402A (1965).
29. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
8 5 cmt. b (1998).
30. Zaza, 675 A.2d at 632-33. The court stated: The general rule is that a manufacturer of
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commend a manufacturer's duty in strict tort liability to provide warnings
as to risks inhering in the use of its product as a component of another
product only when the component supplier actually participated in the
creation of the specificationsfor the end product, and in effect "signed off'
on the suitability of its part or material for integration into such an end
use?' Departures from this approach seem localized to circumstances in
which even ordinary end use of the product could cause death or serious
bodily injury, or where the component supplier, in contrast to its vendee,
was in a clearly superior situation from which to evaluate and reduce the
risk.32
With the passage of years following the 1965 publication of the
so-called "strict liability" rule of the Second Restatement section 402A, the
section 402A design and warning duties, when compared to the duties that
had been assigned under negligence principles, grew to be interpreted so
similarly as to become nearly indistinguishable. One California court,
relying upon the Second Restatement sections 388 and 394 described the
standard for that state in these words:
[Tlhe manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care to
give warning of the dangerous condition of the product or
of facts which make it likely to be dangerous to those
whom he should expect to use the product or be
a coniponent part will not be held strictly liable for failure to warn where the danger
involved is not foreseeable. See, e.g., Cropper v. Rego Distribution Center, Inc., 542 F.
Supp. 1142, 1156 (D. Del. 1982) (holding that component part manufacturer was not liable
for failing to place in its catalog warning of dangers involved in using component part in
connection with unloading riser, on ground that manufacturer could not be expected to
foresee every possible misuse to which part might be put); Maybeny v. Akron Rubber
Machinery Corp., 483 F. Supp. 407, 413-14 (N.D. Okla. 1979) (holding that supplier of
component parts which were not defective did not have duty to warn subsequent product
manufacturer and employees of danger that might arise after components were assembled
according to manufacturer's exclusive design).
3 1. Cf:RESTATEMENT(m)
OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
LIAE~ILITY5 cmt. a (1998) (stating
that the decisional law has not imposed liability upon component suppliers who did not
participate in the integration of the component into the design of the final product).
32. E.g., Stuckey v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1563, 1568 (1 lth Cir. 1989)
(finding that a propane gas supplier had a duty to warn that its product's odorant could
fade); Andrulonis v. U.S., 924 F.2d 1210, 1223 (2d Cir. 1991) (held: government liable for
failure to provide adequate warnings of the risks of particular uses of rabies strain for
research use). See Arena v. Owens Coming, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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endangered by its probable use, if the manufacturer has
reason to believe that they will not realize its dangerous
condition.33
Accordingly, decisional law under both the negligent failure to
warn and the strict liability failure to warn approaches of the Second
Restatement has confirmed repeatedly that component and raw materials
sellers of merchantable products should not, as a general proposition, be
exposed to warning duties. Considerations of both fairness and financial
burden have figured conspicuously in such conclusions. As one court
stated:
Making suppliers of inherently safe raw materials and
component parts pay for the mistakes of the finished
product manufacturerwould not only be unfair, but it also
would impose an intolerable burden on the business world
. . . . Suppliers of versatile materials like chains, valves,
sand, gravel, etc., cannot be expected to become experts
in the infinite number of finished products that might
conceivably incorporate their multi-use raw materials or

component^.^^
Like considerationsguided a widely referenced 1980 decision of a
Pennsylvania federal trial court, Orion Ins. Co. v. United Technologies
Corp.," which involved a manufacturer who built a component part to
spe~ification.~~
Absent a defect in the part, and upon a showing that it was
reasonable for the component manufacturer to rely upon said
specifications,the Orion court concluded:
w]o public policy can be served by imposing a civil
penalty on a manufacturer of specializedparts for a highly

33. Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 319,328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)(quoting the
Second Restatement $8 388,394). Putensen involved the manufacture of tubing and its sale
to hospitals. Id. at 323. Among the tubings' uses was catheterization. Id.
34. In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implant Recipients v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours
& Co., 97 F.3d 1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 1996).
35.502 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa 1980).
36. Id. at 174.
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technical machine according to the specificationssupplied
by one who is expert at assembling these technical
machines, who does so without questioning the plans or
warning of the ultimate user. The effect of such a
decision on component parts manufacturers would be
enormous. They would be forced to retain private experts
to review an assembler's plans and to evaluate the
soundness of the proposed use of the manufa~threr's~arts.
The added cost of such a procedure both financially and
in terms of stifled innovation outweighs the public benefit
of giving plaintiffs an additional pocket to look to for
recovery. I believe the better view is to leave the liability
for design defects where it belongs and where it now
is-with the originator and implementer of the design-the
assembler of the finished pr~duct.~'
In reasoning similar to that of courts evaluating claims against
sellers of component parts, harmonious conclusions have been reached
consistently in claims brought against sellers of raw materials. For
example, a seller's incapacity to anticipate, and therefore to affect end use
risks, provided the basis for defendant's judgment in Pennwalt Corp. v.
Superior ~ o u r t . ~That
'
suit arose from injuries an eighteen year old
plaintiff suffered while attempting to compound chemicals, including
sodium chlorate, aluminum powder, and sulfur:9 at home to create
fireworks. Plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer, distributor, and
retailer of each chemical.40The appellate court held that the manufacturer
of the chemicals should not be liable to plaintiff for the sale of a chemical
that had been repackaged, relabeled, and distributed through a retailer over
which the manufacturerhad no control.'" The court explained:
Sodium chlorate has many legitimate uses, some of which
involve using it in conjunction with other chemicals.
Pennwalt cannot be expected to anticipate every possible
37. Id. at 178.
38.218 Cal. Rptr. 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 677.
41. Id.
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use and issue warnings of any potential danger involved
in each such use. To hold otherwise would place an
impossible burden on a bulk manufacturer which would
be tantamount to imposing absolute liability for injury
resulting from the use of a product not claimed to be
otherwise defe~tive."~
Another California case, Walker v. Staufler Chemical C ~ r p . ? ~
involved a plaintiff who was injured seriously by an explosion of drain
cleaner that contained sulfuric acid.44With respect to the mismarketing
claim brought against the supplier of the sulfuric acid, the court observed:
"We are referred to no California case, nor has independent research
revealed any such, extending the strict liability of the manufacturer (seller)
to the supplier of a substance to be used in compounding or formulating
the product which eventually causes injury to an ultimate con~umer."~'
The Walker court explained further:

.

We see no compelling reason for an extension [of strict
liability] to a situation such as presented in the instant
case . . . . We do not believe it realistically feasible or
necessary to the protection of the public to require the
manufacturer and supplier of a standard chemical
ingredient . . . not having control over the subsequent
compounding, packaging or marketing of an item
,eventually causing injury to the ultimate consumer, to
bear the responsibility for that injury. The manufacturer
(seller) of the product causing the injury is so situated as
to afford the necessary pr~tection.~~

Read together, Pennwalt, Orion, Walker and Staufler invite the
conclusion that under comment p to the Second Restatement section 402A,
no liability should attach to the seller of component parts, raw materials or
ingredients having multiple end uses, the selection of which is beyond the
42. Id.
43.96 Cal. Rptr. 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 805-06.
46. Id. at 806.
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seller's control.
THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENTTREATMENT OF
COMPONENT PART SUPPLIERAND RAW MATERIAL SELLERS'
DUTIES
A.

Generally

Commentary to section 2 (c) of the Third Restatement makes plain
the ALI's conclusion, subject to an exception for the supplier who is
substantially involved in the design of the eventual product, that absent a
defect in the component, the raw material, or the ingredient, liability
should not attach to component sellers whose product is integrated into a
defective end product.47Comment a thereto states:
As a general rule, component sellers should not be liable
when the component itself is not defective as defined in
this Chapter. If the component is not itself defective, it
would be unjust and .inefficientto impose liability solely
on the ground that the manufacturer of the integrated
product utilizes the component in a manner that renders
the integrated product defective. Imposing liability would
require the component seller 40 scrutinize another's
product which the component seller has no role in
developing. This would require the component seller to
develop sufficient sophistication to review the decisions
of the business entity that is already charged with
responsibilityfor the integrated product.48
The Third Restatement provides further support and illustration, stating:
"[A] basic raw material such as sand, gravel, or kerosene cannot be
defectively designed . . . . Accordingly, raw-materials sellers are not
subject to liability for harm caused by defective design of the
end-product."49
Should an employee of the downstream manufacturer or fabricator
47. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS
LIABILITY5 2(c) (1 998).
48. Id. 5 2 cmt. a.
49. Id. 5 5 cmt. c.
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be put at an unreasonable risk by virtue of a misapplication of the
component vendor's product, guidance as to the vendor's warnings
obligations is found in the more general warnings provisions of the Third
Restatement. Regarding sales to informed intermediaries under the Third
Restatement, the conventional rule regarding a seller's informational
obligation to the ultimate user is stated as follows:
There is no general rule as to whether one supplying a
product for the use of others through an intermediary has
a duty to warn the ultimate product user directly or may
rely on the intermediary to relay warnings. The standard
is one of reasonablenessin the circumstances.Among the
factors to be considered are the gravity of the risks posed
by the product, the likelihood that the intermediary will
convey the information to the ultimate user, and the
feasibility and effectiveness of giving a warning directly
to the user.50

B.

The Early Decisional Response

Because of the yet novel quality reality of the Third Restatement,
it would not be realistic to expect a groundswell of judicial reaction, be it
favorable or unfavorable. Nevertheless, the early decisions seem to
suggest that courts find both the articulationand the applicationof the new
rule appealing.
One example is a New Jersey Supreme Court case that involved
injuries sustained by one Gerardo Zaza, an employee of Maxwell House
Coffee (Maxwell House), a division of General Foods."
Upon
discovering a clog in a quench tank, Zaza was burned severely by
scalding hot liquids while attempting to repair the malfuncti~n.'~The
defendant had bid to build the quench tank to the specifications of the
buyer, and these specifications did not require any of the safety devices
that might have prevented the injury.s3 Instead, the specificationsmerely

50. Id. 8 2(c) cmt. i.
5 1. Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620,624 (N.J. 1996).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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required defendant to cut holes for any such safety devices.54
~evi'ewing
the trial court's grant of summary judgment,SS the New
Jersey Supreme Court quoted, with approval, an earlier draft of comment a
to the Third Restatement referenced above. Affirming the judgment below,
the state high court wrote:
The majority of courts from other jurisdictions have held
that a manufacturer of a component part, which is not
dangerous until it is integrated by the owner into a larger
system, cannot be held strictly liable to an injured
employee for the failure of the owner and/or assembler to
install safety devices, so long as the specifications
provided are not so obviously dangerous that it would be
unreasonable to follow them.56
The court in Zaza explained:
Holding defendant liable would impose on a component
part fabricator, whose products were built in accordance
with the designer's specifications and whose part when it
left defendant's plant was not defective, the duty to
investigate whether the use of its non-defective product
'would be made dangerous by the integration of that
product into the complex system designed and installed
54. Id.
55. The trial court stated:

The plaintiff says the defendant failed to provide warnings. There was
no way that the fabricator could even know what the final looks of that
machine would be or what type of use the machine would entail or
what component parts would be added to that tank in order to make it
into a manufacturing instrument, into an operative working unit.
Id. at 626.
56. Id at630. see also Orion Ins. Co. v. United Tech. Corp. 502 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D.
P a 1980); Maybeny v. Akron Rubber Mach. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 407,413 (N.D.
Okla
1979) (holding that "where a supplier fiunishes a component part free of defects and
without knowledge of the design of the end product, strict liability should not be imposed
on the supplier for injury resulting from the end product design"); Woods v. Graham Eng'g
Corp., 539 N.E.2d 316,318-19 (111. App. 2d 1989) (holding that component manufacturer
liable only when responsible for final design of product or component part itself caused
injury).
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by experts. Component fabricators would become
insurers for the mistakes and failures of the owners and
installers to follow their own plans. Defendant would
have to retain an expert to determine whether each and
every integrated manufacturing system that incorporates
one of its sheet metal products is reasonably safe for its
intended use . . . . Even if defendant wanted to provide a
warning, there is no suitable location on the quench tank
for a warning. The quench tank is not a single unit
designed to come into contact with workers. Moreover,
plaintiffdid not produce any evidence that the tank was so
obviously dangerous that International had an obligation
to warn the users of the trecar-carbon regeneration
system. Maxwell House's plans called for the installation
of safety devices, and professionals were hired to ensure
that the plans were followed . . . . The duty to warn does
not extend to the speculative anticipation of how
component parts that are not defective can become
potentially dangerous, depending on the nature of their
integration into a complex system designed and
assembled by an~ther.~'
Another recent obeisance to the Third Restatement component
seller rule is Artiglio v. General Electric Co. a silicon breast implant suit
before a California Appeals Court, in which appellant appealed a summary
judgment.59 The underlying claim was that the silicon supplier breached a
duty to warn customers about the claimed potential hazards of silicon in
these medical devices.60The facts showed that General Electric (GE), the
manufacturer of the silicon, supplied it in fifty-five gallon drums to
McGhan Medical Corp., which manufactured the implant^.^' On appeal,
GE argued the rectitude of the verdict, stating that:
[Blecause it supplied silicone materials which are used in
57. Id. at 634-35.
58.71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
59. Id. at 818.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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a number of other products, because the silicone materials
it provided were subject to further processing by the
actual manufacturers of breast implants and because the
implant manufacturers themselves had the ability to
determine the suitability and safety of the implants, it
owed no duty of care to the eventual recipients of the
silicone breast implants.62
After' turning to what may eventually become an obligatory
reference to the Third Restatement section 5 comment c, the appellate
court continued by relying upon comment b, which addresses
"sophisticated buyers" and states:
[Wlhen a sophisticatedbuyer integrates a component into
another product, the component seller owes no duty to
warn either the immediate buyer or ultimate consumers of
dangers arising because the component is unsuited for the
special purpose to which the buyer puts it. To impose a
duty to warn in such a circumstance would require that
component sellers monitor the development of products
and systems into which their components are to be
integrated.63
Affirming the court below, the appellate division summarized:
Taken together, [authority establishes] that component
and raw material suppliers are not liable to ultimate
consumerswhen the goods or material they supply are not
inherently dangerous, they sell goods or material in bulk
to a sophisticated buyer, the material is substantially
changed during the manufacturing process and the
supplier has a limited role in developing and designing
62. Id. GE's chemical "building block" for the manufacture of silicon was
polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS). Id. GE used PDMS manufacturing "a host of silicone
materials for use by the manufacturers of everything from bed pads to electronic circuit
boards to food additives to other medical devices." Id.
63. Id. at 822 (The Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement Third of Torts, Products
Liability, 8 5, approved on May 20, 1997).

Heinonline - - 26 N. Ky. L. Rev. 554 1999

19991 COMPONENT PARTS AND RAW MATERIALS SELLERS 555
the end product. When these factors exist, the social cost
of imposing a duty to the ultimate consumers far exceeds
any additional protection provided to consumers.64
THE TORT GOALS OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY
A.

\

Generally

One court wrote recently: "Products liability law is based on
concepts of fairness, feasibility, practicality and functional responsibility.
[Courts] have always stressed the public's interest in motivating
individualsand commercialenterprises to invest in safety. . . ."65
In the above review of the liability rules and the decisional law
thereunder, the courts, the ALI authors of the comments to the Second
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, and the Third Restatement
frequently invoke expressions such as "just," or "unjust," or "efficient," or
"social cost." These terms have broadly understood common colloquial
meanings, so that an "inefficient"tort rule is interpretedas one that wastes
money. I would like now to think in terms of economic efficiencydeterrence, and correctivejustice-morality, in a more particularizedway.
The
There are today two contrasting schools of tort phil~sophy.~~
older of the two approaches is commonly termed correctivejustice, and its
influential group of scholars hew to the position that the original and
64. Id. See also In re TMJ Implants Products Liability Litigation, 97 F.3d 1050, 1057 (8th
Cir. 1996).
65. Zaza v. Marquess & Nell Inc., 675 A.2d 620,636 (N.J. 1996).
66. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Aflrming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX.L. REV. 1801 (1997). Mr. Schwartz stated that: "currently there
are two major camps of tort scholars. One understands tort liability as an instrument aimed
largely at the goal of deterrence, commonly explained within the framework of economics.
The other looks at tort law as a way of achieving corrective justice between the parties." Id.
See generally John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J . LEGALSTUD.419,454-55
(1979) (commending "conception of tort law that rivals the dominant economic one,"
employing "notions of individual moral responsibility . . . logically excluded from the
latter"); Matthew S. O'Comel, Correcting Corrective Justice: Unscrambling the Mixed
Conception of Tort Law, 85 GEO.L.J. 1717 (1997). The article stated that generally
accepted theories of tort law can be divided into two classes: instrumental theories, which
view social cost and efficiency as the essential factors in evaluating rights and duties under
the law, and noninstrumental theories, which view law as the vindication of a scheme of
moral responsibility. Id.
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primary goal of tort law, including the law of products liability, is righting
wrongs caused by tortious behavior.67 With its strong overlay of moral
obligation, and the annulment of a wrongdoer's unjust enrichment, the
corrective justice approach posits that tort's principal raison d72tre is to
return parties suffering personal physical injury or property damage due to
another's tortious conduct to the status quo ante,,at least insofar as money
damages can so do.68 The more recently developed approach is one of
economic efficiency, an evaluation that seeks to demonstrate that the
appropriate measure of the success, or failure, of tort law ought to proceed
under an economic analysis,6' emphasizing evaluation of such
considerations as wealth maximization, avoidance of waste, and
o~erdeterrence.'~

B.

Corrective Justice-Morality

As a corollary to the correctivejustice rectificatory goal of setting
matters straight between the parties, the correctivejustice model sets forth
the broader societal objective of reducing the occurrence of similar wrongs
in the future. The correctivejustice objective of deterrence is evidenced in
such early writings as that of one academic author, who in 1890 wrote of
the goals of the negligence action in these words: "The really important
matter is to adjust the dispute between the parties by a rule of conduct
which shall do justice if possible in the particular case, but which shall
also be suitable to the needs of the community, and tend to prevent like
accidents from happening in the f~ture."~' The Supreme Court, in
67. See JULES L. C O W , RISKSAND WRONGS197 (1992).
68. See id (noting that one of two ways of "understanding tort law ... emphasizes its role in
rectifying for wrong done").
69. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Eflciency
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRAL. REV.487 (1980) (discussing efficiency
norm and wealth maximization); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of
Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377,381 (1994).
70. See id.
71. William Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HARV.
L.
REV. 263, 269 (1890); accord Barrett v. Superior Court (Paul Hubbs Constr. Corp.), 272
Cal. Rptr. 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting term "wrongful act" in wrongful death
statute to mean tortious act). The Barrett court commented further that by choosing not to
limit the measure of damages, "California has chosen to strengthen the deterrent aspect of
the civil sanction: "the sting of unlimited recovery . . . more effectively penalize [s] the
culpable defendant and deter[s] it and others similarly situated from such future conduct"' . .
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Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 72 implicitly recognized the deterrence role of
an award of tort damages, i.e., that a tort judgment equates to a
"requirement or prohibition" in that such tort judgments force actors to
make behavioral modifications upon pain of paying large money awards.73
Corrective justice principles in tort are intended to minimize not
only the personal physical injury effect of accidents, but also to lessen the
intrusions such accidents work upon others' autonomy and liberty
interests. Personal autonomy is stated repeatedly to be part of that bundle
of modern citizenship rights, the perimeters of which law should
mediate.74 A dictionary defines "autonomy" as "independence or
freed~m."~'
If the correlative right of "liberty," which has been defined as
"freedom from external control or interference, obligations, etc.; freedom
to
is added to freedom, then the freedom to choose and the
informed choice rationale of a seller's warnings obligations are
inextricably related.

Economic analysis of tort law is not limited to one analytical
construct. More than one vantage point from which an economic
observation of products liability rules may be made. The "utilitarian
theory" invites the assessment of the relative social cost associated with
favoring one course of conduct over another. Coase, with his example of
the physician and the c~nfectioner,'~ prompts application of utilitarian

. rather than to protect defendants from excessive financial burdens." Id. at 308'(citations
omitted). See also Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 291 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (stating one principal purpose of strict liability was to provide an economic incentive
for improved product safety).
72.505 U.S. 504 (1992).
73. Id. at 536 (Blackrnun ,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 363 (Tex. 1993) (Doggett, J.,
dissenting). Justice Doggett stated that "[tlhe requirement that manufacturers provide
adequate warnings serves the dual goals of 'risk reduction and the protection of individual
autonomy in decision-making."' Id. (quoting W. PAGEKEETON ET AL., PROSSERAND
KEETONON THE LAWOF TORTS4 96, at 685 (5th ed. 1984)).
DICTIONARY
92 (rev. ed. 1975).
75. THERANDOM HOUSECOLLEGE
76. Id. at 772.
77. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
1, 13 (1960) (stating
that in a setting where confectioner's operation causes disturbance to physician's practice,
appropriate question is not who should compensate physician in nuisance, but rather
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theory to the products liability context, in which the question might be
posed this way: To what extent is it worthwhile to restrict or encumber
product availability in order to achieve marginally safer products, or,
considering social cost, is it preferable to ensure a broader range of
products, conceding that more products with marginally higher potential.
for harm will exist in the market? Thus, a utilitarian or social cost model
measures a tort rule's practical effect o'n plaintiffs and defendants as a
whole, and considers how much social and economic cost we are prepared
to incur in order to maintain product availability.
Another perspective that has played an ascendant role in modern
economic analysis of tort law involves the concepts of "wealth
maximization'' and "efficiency," and the relationship between them.
Michael D. Green describes the "wealth maximizationM--"economic
efficiency" relationship in these terms: "By economic efficiency [is meant]
maximizing total societal resources, without concern for the distributionof
those resources among members of so~iety."'~ One of the efficiency
school's most noteworthy constructs'has been to "emphasize [tort law's]
To Posner, apart
role in substituting for efficient contractual e~change."'~
from the corrective justice, moral and fairness attributes of tort liability,
the law and economics argument is that any intentional tort or accident
law doctrine should "dete[r] persons from engaging in activities that a
reasonable person would view ahead of time to be socially wasteful."80
In Posner's words, such torts, i.e., unconsented to harmful acts,
"involve . . . a coerced transfer of wealth to the defendant occurring in a
settjng of low transaction costs. Such conduct is inefficient because it
violates the principle . . . that where market transaction costs are low,
people should be required to use the market if they can and to desist from
the conduct if they can't.
Posner concludes that such bypassing of the
market is inefficient and therefore should create liability in tort.82

''

whether social costs and gains are best sewed by preservation of status quo, by cessation of
confectionefs activities, or by cessation of physician's activities).
78. Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Eflciency: Doubts, 75 TEX.L. REV. 1605,
1607 n.12 (1997) (citing Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial DecisionMaking, 4 INT'L REV.L. & ECON.
13 1, 132 (1984)).
79. COLEMAN,
supra note 67 at 197.
80. J w A. HENDERSON, JR. FT AL., THETORTSPROCESS29-30 (4th ed. '1 994) (discussing
RICHARD
A. POSNER,ECONOMIC
ANALYSISOF THE LAW206-1 1 (4th ed. 1992)).
8 1 . RIA. POSECONOMIC
ANALYSISOF 'IHE LAW208 (4 th ed. 1992).
82. Id. at 207-09.
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Transferred to a products liability context, what of the seller of a defective
product that causes personal physical injury or property damage?
Economists might recast the corrective justice goals of
encouraging individual autonomy and liberty to efficiency-based
objectives phrased in terms of discouraging involuntary transfers of
or imposition of negative
externalities. A
wealth, market avoidanceYg3
product purchaser has a societally-countenancedexpectation,the argument
goes, that the product will not create an unreasonable risk of harm if used
for its reasonably foreseeable purpose.84 Should the product prove
dangerously defective, and should the purchaser be injured or his property
damaged, the manufacturer has, in a sense, subverted the market and
created accident costsSS that might have been avoided had the
83. See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YALEL.J. 353, 355 (1988) (supposing consumer sovereignty as dominant objective in
transactions between contracting parties, under which norm: "the law should reflect the
preferences of competent, informed consumers regarding risk allocation.") See also
Kathryn Dix Sowle, Toward a Synthesis ofproduct Liability Principles: Schwartz's Model
and the Cost-MinimizationAlternative, 46 U . MIAMI
L. REV. 1 , 9 (1991). Werner Z. Hirsch
has observed that: "broadly speaking, a tort is a civil (seldom a criminal) wrong. Such a
wrong occurs when one party, usually unintentionally, destroys another party's initial
entitlement by imposing a negative externality on him. The courts can then provide a
remedy in the form of damages. When externalities result in the forcible taking of initial
entitlements--for example, when a slaughterhouse pollutes the air of the surrounding
neighborhood--liability rules can be invoked. Concomitantly government assumes
responsibility for the imposition of objectively determined compensation and its prompt
payment to the party harmed." WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS:
AN
INTRODUCTORY
ANALYSIS
127 (1979).
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 2 cmt. a (1998)
(Reporters' Note). The comment states that "[Sltrict liability has been justified on fairness
grounds because the product containing a hidden manufacturing defect that causes harm
disappoints the consumer's or user's reasonable expectations with regard to safety." (citing,
inter alia, F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for
Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29
L. REV. 465 (1978); Marshall
S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Comumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and
Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA.L. REV. 1109 (1974)).
85. See GUIDOCALABRESI,
THECOSTSOF ACCIDENTS: A LEGALAND E C O N OANALYSIS
~
129 (1970) (discussing loss spreading, general deterrence, and specific deterrence
approaches to accident cost reduction). Stephen Sugarman has summarized Calabresi's
cost-avoidance philosophy:
In [The Costs of Accidents], Calabresi argued that society's policy
towards accidents should be to minimize the sum of primary,
secondary, and tertiary accident costs. Reducing primary costs concerns
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manufacturer simply bargained for pertinent product-related rights.
Perhaps the best substitute for an actual bargained for exchange is
a circumstance in which a buyer, fully apprised of pertinent safety-related
information and instructions for the safe operation of a product, makes an
informed decision to purchase the product for the buyer's use or for
devotion to the use of others. Such a knowledgeable consent or choice
model for sale of a product with a high risk level means, in a
proto-contractual sense, that the seller has bargained for the right to sell it.
In essence, the seller preserves the transaction within the market by
conveying warnings sufficient to permit the purchasers to make informed
choices of whether or not to expose themselves to the risk. Absent a
bargain struck with an informed purchaser, the sale of a product defective
for want of adequate warnings, and that proximately causes plaintiffs
harm, represents an involuntary or coerced transfer of wealth from the
injured party to the injurer.
A primitive but persuasive evaluative standard was offered in a
negligence context by Judge Learned Hand in the opinions in United
States v. Carroll Towing CO.,'~and Conway v. O'Brien." In those two
cases, the Second Circuit held that the degree of care appropriate to a
given action or omission to act should be the result of a three-factor

promoting safety (while not discouraging, if possible, socially desirable
innovation). Reducing secondary costs concerns spreading the costs of
compensation paid to accident victims. Tertiary costs are the
transactions costs; these costs include the costs of lawyers' fees,
insurance administration, the parties' time, and court costs.
Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN.L. REV. 1163, 1167 (1992)
(review essay). Jules Coleman hrther explains the three types of costs attributable to
personal injury or property damage torts:
Primary costs are the dollar equivalent of the damages caused by
accidents. Secondary costs are the costs of bearing the costs of
accidents. These are the costs associated with the various schemes for
distributing the primary (and tertiary) costs of accidents. Secondary
costs are reduced when they are spread maximally over persons and
time, or when they are borne by those individuals in the best position to
bear them. Tertiary costs are the ndministrative costs of any system,
including the tort system, for determining who should bear the costs of
accidents.
COLEMAN,
supra note 67 at 204.
86. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
87. 111 F.2d 61 1,612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 3 12 U.S. 492 (1941).
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calculus: (1) the likelihood that the conduct will injure others; (2)
multiplied by the seriousnessof the risk if it happens; (3) balanced against
the burden of taking precautions against the risk." In formula, the
calculation is known as B (Burden) < P (Probability of Harm) X L
(Magnitude of Loss Should It Occur).89 The Learned Hand approach can
be conformed to a more modem utilitarian analysis by visualizing B, or
the Burden upon the actor, as encompassingnot only the particular burden
of precautionarymeasures upon the actor, but also the burden upon society
if the conduct must either be eliminated due to liability rules, or made
more expensive if the precautionarymeasures are ~ndertaken.~
Posner machined the Hand formulation into an efficiency . . .
principle by explaining that:
Hand was adumbrating,perhaps unwittingly, an economic
meaning of negligence. Discounting (multiplying) the
cost of an accident if it occurs by the probability of
occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit to be
anticipated from incurring the costs necessary to prevent
the accident . . . . If the cost of safety measures [including,
perhaps,
'eliminating the
activity']
or
of
curtailment--whichever cost is lower--exceeds the benefit
in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost,
society would be better off, in economic terms, to forgo
accident pre~ention.~'
88. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173; Conway 111 F.2d at 612.
89. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
90. Likewise, in keeping with a utilitarian economic view that transcends the concerns of
the individual plaintiff and defendant, consideration of the factors P (Probability of Harm)
and the L (Magnitude of the Loss should it occur) would be enlarged to contemplate the
likelihood of harm to others identically or similarly situated, and the magnitude of the
potential harm, not only in terms of the individual plaintiff but also to the population
exposed to the risk.
91. Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, 1 J . LEGALSTUD.29, 32 (1972). Posner
continues:
When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a rational
profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments . . . rather than
incur the larger cost of avoiding liability. Furthermore, overall
economic value or welfare would be diminished rather than increased
by incurring a higher accident-prevention cost in order to avoid a lower
accident cost . . . . Perhaps, then, the dominant function of the fault
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Least Cost Avoider

A leading exponent of the efficiency role of the common law of
tort has been Guido Calabresi, who has argued persuasively that in matters
of compensation for accidents, civil liability should ordinarily be laid at
the door of the "cheapest cost avoider," the actor who could most easily
discover and inexpensively remediate the hazard.92 Together with A.
Douglas Melamed, and employing the setting of environmental harm,
Calabresi asserts that considerations of economic efficiency dictate
placing the costs of accidents "on the party or activity which can most
cheaply avoid them."93 Posner's harmonious observation has been that in
system is to generate rules of liability that if followed will bring about,
at least approximately, the efficient--the cost-justified--level of
accidents and safety . . . . Because we do not like to see resources
squandered, a judgment of negligence has inescapable overtones of
moral disapproval, for it implies that there was a cheaper alternative to
the accident . . . . Where, [alternatively,] the measures necessary to
avert the accident would have consumed excessive resources, there is
no occasion to condemn the defendant for not having taken them.

Id. at 33.
92. Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge? Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21
HOFSTRAL. REV. 183, 193 (1992).
93. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1108-09 (1972); see
also MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING
ACCIDENTCOSTS: INSURANCE,
LIABILITY,AND TORT
REFORM 29, 32-33 (1995) (analyzing rationale for insurance and addressing concern that
cost-spreading function will divert compensatory responsibility away from least cost
avoider). one frequently-referenced validation of the "least cost avoider" can be found in
Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974), a California coastal oil spill case in
which the court allowed commercial fishermen to recover from defendant their business
losses caused by lost fishing opportunity during a period of pollution. Id. The court found
justice and efficiency were sewed by placing responsibility for the loss on the "best cost
avoider" (in this setting the defendant oil company), reasoning: "[Tlhe loss should be
allocated to that party who can best correct any error in allocation, if such there be, by
acquiring the activity to which the patty has been made liable . . . . The capacity "to buy
out" the plaintiffs if the burden is too great is, in essence, the real focus of Calabresi's
approach. On this basis there is no contest--the defendants' capacity is superior." Id. at 570.
COSTOF A c c m m : A LEGALANDECONO& ANALYSIS,
50 (citing Guido Calabresi, 'I&
52 (1970)). Calabresi and Hirschoff provide a concise description of what the least cost
avoider approach requires, both of private parties and of the government:
The strict liability test we suggest does not require that a governmental
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the so called alternativecare - indemnity damage shifting scenario, "we do
not want both tortfeasors to take precautions; we want the lower cost
accident avoider to do so."94 It is seen readily that a cheapest cost avoider
leads us to the conclusion that the component parts supplier, or a raw
materials supplier, is not ordinarily the entity that can most readily detect
risks posed by a completed product, or reduce such risks to a reasonable
level.
2.

Pareto Eficiency

From another, yet still efficiency-influenced, perspective a
products liability doctrine that passes efficiency muster probably would
result also in a Pareto superior or even a Pareto optimal resolution?' A rule
is Pareto optimal when its effects benefit all parties, in essence, a win-win
prop~sition.~~
AS summarized by Mark Seidenfeld: "An economic change
institution make . . . a cost-benefit analysis. It requires . . . only a
decision as to which of the parties to the accident is in the best position
to make a cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident
avoidance costs and to act on the decision once it is made. The question
for the court reduces to a search for the cheapest cost avoider.
Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972).
94. POSNER,
supra, note 81 at 189. In some settings defendants themselves have sought to
employ the cheapest cost avoider rationale to promote a finding of no liability when a
consumer aware of product risks is, the argument goes, the party that can most cheaply
avoid the accident costs See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1254
(N.J. 1990) (discussing defendant's argument that cigarette consumers are cheapest cost
avoiders).
ECONOMIC
95. The Pareto criteria for wealth maximization analysis are summarized in
ANALYSIS
OF TORTLAWwhich states:
The first application of the Pareto criteria is to evaluate the desirability
of changes in the distribution of goods. Pareto's system allows that
evaluation without regard to the desirability of the initial distribution
among individuals of either their abilities to pay or enjoy and without
the need for interpersonal utility comparisons. Imagine a society in
which all resources have already been allocated to particular
individuals. Now imagine a change in allocations that left at least one
person better off and no one worse off. Surely that change is desirable
from any perspective. Economists refer to such a' change in the
allocation of resources as a Pareto superior change.
DAVIDW. BARNES& LYNNA. STOUT,
THEECONOMIC
ANALYSISOF TORTLAWI1 (1992).
96. Id. at 12. Richard A. Posner further elaborated upon the principle by stating:
'
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is considered a Pareto improvement [or Pareto superior] if it makes some
individuals better off without making any person worse off. A state of the
economic system is Pareto optimal [or Pareto efficient] if there is no
Pareto superior state that society can reach. If we are using the Pareto
criterion to evaluate our economic system, we say that a Pareto optimal
state is "economically effi~ient."~'A liability rule that creates burdens
upon one participant with no correlative benefits to other participants
would be denominated Pareto inefficient.
V.

COMPONENT PART AND RAW MATERIAL SELLERS'
DUTIES ANALYZED IN TERMS OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
AND EFFICIENCY

A.

Corrective Justice-Morality

With regard to warnings obligations particularly, the "informed
consent" rationale reflects the societal judgment that a product user or
consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to whether the product's
utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of harm.98 From the
standpoint of corrective justice, warnings adequate to permit a product
user to make an informed decision as to whether to expose himself or
others to the risk are central to preservation of a product user's autonomy
interest^.^' From an efficiency perspective, informed decision making by a
[Tlhe Pareto principle . . . is that a change (including a change brought
about by an accident or an intentional act) is good if it makes at least
one person better off and no one worse off. This is a 'liberal' principle
akin to Kant's and Mill's principle that everyone is entitled to as much
liberty as is consistent with the liberty of all other people.
Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquity, in
PH~LOSOPH~CAL
FOUNDATIONSOF TORTLAW99,104 (David G.Owen ed., 1995).
97. MARKSEIDENFELD,
MICROECONOMIC
PREDICATES
TO LAWAND ECONOMICS
49 (1996).
For a general description of Pareto optimality principles, see ROBINPAULMALLOY,LAW
AND ECONOMICS:
A COMPARATIVE
APPROACHTO THEORY
AND PRAC~CE
(1990).
98. See, e.g., Bore1 v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). The
court stated that "a true choice situation arises, and a duty to warn attaches, whenever a
reasonable man would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose
himself to it." Id. at 1089; Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1498 (D. Kan. 1987)
(holding that consumer has right to know risks so that he can make informed decision).
99. Conversely, a risk creatofs interest in self autonomy diminishes to the extent that he
has "already injected himself into the plaintiffs realm." Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F.
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plaintiff permits the buyer-seller transaction to be fairly characterized as
an agreement that avoids the extracontractualinefficienciesof involuntary
wealth transfers.'""
In the context of hypothesized warnings that might be required of
a seller of, to employ an earlier example, Teflon (TM), there is no
practicable means for a seller to communicate cautionary information to
the ultimate user or consumer. There is an accepted doctrine in the law of
product warnings that permits a bulk seller to discharge its warning
obligations by its provision to the immediate vendee, ordinarily the injured
party's employer, sufficient safety related information to permit the vendee
to provide adequate warnings to users.lO' This approach fails in the setting
of raw materials and components parts sellers for this reason: The
accepted doctrine is premised on the seller's ascertainmentthat the vendee
is sufficiently sophisticatedand responsible to convey such information to
the users. This predicate is arguably workable when the product is
establishedand its accepted use fairly well defined. An example might be
an industrial solvent, and the risks to be communicated might logically
focus on ventilation, inhalation, dermal exposure and flammability. For
newer synthetic products, in contrast, the boundless and growing potential
applications and misapplications, effectively preclude a seller's confident
transmittal of safety information to its vendee. Due to the new and
dynamic uses to which the raw material might be put, a seller might not
yet know of either the potential risks or the capacity of the vendee to
responsibly communicatethem to either employees or consumers.
A representativeexpression of the "informed consent" rationale of
warnings analysis has been put this way: The duty to warn arises
"whenever a reasonable man would want to be informed of the risk in
order to decide whether to expose himselfto it."lo2Thus, a core attribute of
the Reporters' approach is one of vindicating the personal autonomy
interest that underpins correctivejustice.
Supp. 1421, 1494 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Shlomo Twerski, Note, AJirmative Duty Ajfer
Tarasofi 1 1 HOFSTRAL. REV. 1013, 1025 (1983)), modijed on other grounds, 924 F.2d
1210 (2d Cir. 1991).
100. Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 81 1,814 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973)). The Borel case
stated that a product must not be made available to the public without disclosure of the
dangers that the application of reasonable foresight would reveal. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089.
101. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF PRODUCTS
LIABILIIY 2 cmt. i (1998).
102. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089.
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With respect to warning obligations to intermediaries,no hardship
is worked upon correctivejustice principles by continuation of the nearly
universal rule that a warning only to an intermediarywill satisfy a seller's
obligations when, in the totality of the circumstances, it can be predicted
that pertinent safety-related information will be effectively conveyed to
the end user.'03 In a scenario often involving risks of personal injury to
workplace users of the product, the Third Restatement preserves the
conventional rule regarding a seller's informational obligation to remote
users by stating: "The standard is one of reasonableness in the
circumstances.Among the factors to be considered are the gravity of the
risks posed by the product, the likelihood that the intermediarywill convey
the information to the ultimate user, and the feasibility and effectiveness
of giving a warning directly to the user."lo4 This approach is in no
material way unlike that' suggested by the earlier Second 'Restatement
section 388, comment n and it is consistent with the protocol described in
the leading case law.
A like conclusion can be reached in claims arising from use of, or
contact with, raw materials. In terms of corrective justice, the sellers of
raw materials, many of which are transformed into a seemingly limitless
array of applications by downstream participants in the commercial chain,
have not, in any meaningful way, caused a plaintiffs harm. As a plaintiff
may pursue a remedy against the distributive participant who did work the
allegedly harmful change or modification in the material that triggered a
warning obligation, the principles of corrective justice likewise are
preserved.

In the context of component part suppliers or the sellers of raw
materials that will be transformed into a part of a multitude of products,
the developed Hand formulation, supports the conclusion under the Third
Restatement that neither warning nor design duties should ordinarily attach
to the supplier. Apart from the rare instance in which the supplier knows
specifically of, or has actually participated in the judgment to utilize the
component part or raw material in an application that entails excess
preventable risk, the supplier will not have the expertise to appreciate, and
103. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
4 2 cmt. i (1998).
104. Id.
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as a practical matter has no means to accurately foresee, the uses to which
the product will be put. The burden, therefore, of assuming this
responsibility (acquisition of staff, micro-inquiries into the proposed uses
to which vendees will put the product) will therefore be quite large. Even
at its extremity such a burden could not be confidently discharged, as the
potential incautious uses to which a component part or a raw material may
be put are bordered only by the human imagination. Thus, definitionally
the burden of such precautionary measures is potentially boundless, and
therefore in most instances greater than the probability of a harm (again
unquantifiable) times the magnitude of the loss should it occur (again
unquantifiable).
In the main, the Third Restatement's treatment of warnings can be
harmonized readily with both Posner's market efficiency and Calabresi's
least cost avoider approaches. By declining to take a position that suggests
that a warning should be given even where the risk and the means of its
avoidance are abundantly clear, the Reporters avoid adding unnecessary
precautionarycosts to the marketingof products of utility by stating that:
From a fairness perspective, requiring individual users
and consumers to bear appropriate responsibility for
proper product use prevents careless users and consumers
from being subsidized by more careful users and
consumers, when the former are paid damages out of
funds to which the latter are forced to contribute through
higher product prices.'05
While phrased in terms of fairness, this assertion speaks with
equal persuasiveness in terms of
In addition, a sketch of
105. Id. 4 2 cmt. a
106. But see Howard A. Latin, Behavioral Criticisms of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, 16 J . PROD& TOXICS
LIAB.209,2 12 (1994). Latin argues:
[The Reporters suggest] that courts should avoid requiring warnings
about "obvious product" risks. However, courts often disagree about
which particular product hazards are obvious, and the Reporters offer
no guidance on just how obvious a risk must be before courts should
hold as a matter of law that warnings need not mention the risk. A
hazard obvious to 80 percent of product users would not be evident to
the other 20 percent, and the costs of providing a more complete
warning to this minority group may be justified in comparison with the
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Pareto efficient application to a component seller's warning duties readily
reveals that warning duties create a cost to the seller, which will be passed
along to vendees, with no commensurate benefit in terms of reducing
avoidable accident costs. As it is the downstream formulator or fabricator
that can most readily and inexpensively anticipate and ameliorate risk,
placement of informationalobligationsupon the vendee can be considered
Pareto efficient, while application of warnings duties upon the component
seller would be Pareto inefficient.
Regarding the Third Restatement's approach to warnings to
intermediaries and with respect to raw materials, the influence of
efficiency considerations is even more apparent. In confirming that the
objective of the Third Restatement § 2(c) comment i is indistinguishable
from that of the Second Restatement section 388 comment n,"' the
Reporters emphasize the Third Restatement's goal of lowering accident
costs by recognizing that it is ordinarily the workplace supervisorwho can
most efficiently and effectivelycommunicaterisk information, particularly
in settings involving bulk sales of potentially hazardous material^.'^^ Thus,
the Third Restatement promotes an efficient rule that would relieve the
component or ingredient supplier of liability when the component or
ingredient is not itself defective. In such circumstances,the component or
ingredient supplier ordinarily has no meaningful control over the hazard
level, if any, of the finished p r o d u ~ t .As
' ~ between the ingredient supplier
accident losses that could be prevented. Once it is acknowledged that
human cognitive capacities and receptivity to new information vary
widely, which is amply demonstrated by the social science evidence,
there is no reason to assume that a risk "obvious" to many product users
will be equally "obvious" to others.
Id. at 216. See also Howard A. Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and
Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994) (setting forth considerable
social science evidence supporting the above-stated assertion).
107. Comment i of 8 2(c) of the Third Restatement and comment n of 8 388 of the Second
Restatement both pertain to warning duties to third persons.
108. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY8 2(c) cmt. i, no. 5
(1998) (Reporters' Note).
109. Any substance can be hazardous. As the 16th century physician Paracelsus stated:
"'What is not a poison? All things are poison and none without poison. Only the dose
determines that a thing is not a poison."' Charles E. Erway, 111, The Ingredient Supplier
Defense, 16 J . PROD. & Toxlcs LIAB. 269, 273 & n.15 (1994) (quoting AMERICAN
CONFERJWCE
OF GOVERNMENTAL
INDUS.HYGENISTS,THRESHOLD L m VALUESDISCUSSION
AND THIRTY-FIVE
YEARINDEX WITH
RECOMMENDAT~ONS
332 (1984)).
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and the downstream assembler or formulator, the proper conclusion is that
the downstream formulator, with its superior (and often exclusive)
knowledge of the product's end use, and which is responsible for ultimate
design, formulation, packaging, risk information and marketing, should
remain the principal locus of potential liability."0
The tort goal of deterrence. is in no way compromised by
application of a "no duty" rule to mere suppliers of merchantable raw
materials. A residual duty of reasonablenessexists in the supplier's duty to
supply what has been ordered. If a standard grade of copper is ordered and
what is supplied is contaminated or a different grade and an injury results,
the raw material supplier should be subject to liability. Likewise, if a raw
material supplier goes beyond its traditional role and actively participates
in the manufacturingprocess, its conduct should be judged on the basis of
a reasonableness standard. Both of the aforementioned duties provide the
raw materials supplier with an incentive to conduct its business consistent
with a standard of reasonableness,and to avoid harmful behavior.
Deterrence only works if behavior exists that can be encouraged
or prevented. Case law ranging from the most inchoate early rules to the
most modern analyses have suggested that the manufacturer of the
product, and not the raw material supplier, is in the best position to prevent

110. Illuminating in this regard is SheN Oil Co. v. Harrison, 425 So. 2d 67, 70 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982), a suit brought against the manufacturer of the chemical DBCP,which was
sold to a formulator who used it as an ingredient of a fumigant claimed to have injured farm
workers. Id. at 68. As the court stated: "[Llabeling and packaging requirements necessarily
differ depending on the particular [end product] formulation and, thus, place the
responsibility on the formulator for providing adequate warning to the public . . . ." Id. at
70. Similarly, and illustrative of application of the least cost avoider approach, is
Beauchamp v. Russell, 547 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D.Ga 1982), involving the issue of the
connection, if any, between an air valve component in a pneumatically-run pelletizer and
the injury of plaintiff's spouse. Id. at 1193. The court suggested that the duty to warn
should properly be placed upon the participant in manufacture with the greatest access to
information and the easiest means of its dissemination. Id. at 1197. In the,,words of the
court:
The responsibility for information collection and dissemination should
rest on the party who has the greatest access to the information and who
can make it available at the-lowest cost. Where a component part is
incorporated into another product, without material change, the
manufacturer of the part is in the best position to bear this
responsibility."
Id.
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an accident or injury. First, the manufacturer is a knowledgeable
purchaser, usually industrial, and is aware of the problems that a raw
material can cause. Second, the manufacturer alone knows about its
products, as well as who is likely to use them. The manufacturer is in the
appropriate position to formulate warnings and to design its product so as
to prevent injury. If it is impossible to prevent some risks, the Third
Restatement requires manufacturers to warn about them, unless they
involve hazards that everybody knows about.
The TMJ cases are significantbecause they have made it clear that
knowledge of how a raw material will be used does not, by itself, create a
duty to investigatethe risks posed by the final product."'
A Third Restatement "no duty" rule governing sales of
merchantable component parts, raw materials, and ingredients, represents
sound policy. If those who mined copper, lead, or fabricated steel were
strictly liable for harms caused by end-use products, insurance would be
either unavailable or enormously costly. Those saddled with the task of
actuarially determining a proper rate would be faced with indeterminate
liability because they would not know what products would eventually be
made. Delineating a rational starting point for, or cessation of potential
liability, would be impossible. By way of contrast, an insurer for the
end-use product producer can look at, and evaluate, based on history and
rational projections, insurance risks of end-use products. Information on
liability costs, past and projected, is crucial to carriers seeking to make
coverage decisions and to set premiums. This information is available to
the manufacturerof the end product, while it is normally unavailable to the
supplier of raw materials potentially suited to a large number of potential
end uses. Thus, the raw materials manufacturer, if subject to potential
liability for harms caused by products in which the material ultimately was
an ingredient, could never procure liability insurance in an informed and
cost effective way. In terms of efficiency, insurance becomes less
expensive, and the raw materials supplier and the end use manufacturer
avoid duplicating insurance coverage.

11 1. See, e.g., In re TMJ Implants Products Liability Litigation, 97 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir.
1996).
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CONCLUSION
Liability issues pertaining to component part, raw material and
ingredient suppliers are both longstanding and pervasive in the purchase
and sale of products. These questions concerned transactions ranging
from the sale of behemoth turbines for ocean-going vessels in East River
Steamship Corp. v. ~ransamericaDelaval,"* where the Supreme Court
applied the economic loss doctrine, and the Supreme Court observed that
virtually every product has component^,"^ to the more prosaic, for
example, fiber binding tape that a hypothetical business, "Boxes Are Us",
might use to secure cardboard boxes used in shipping countless types of
items.lI4 The longstanding nature of these questions was highlighted
recently in a newspaper article I read that speculated that the reason the
iceberg damaged the Titanic so mortally was because the rivets employed
to bind together the hull plates had a level of internal metallurgical
imperfectionsfar exceedingwhat would be expected even in that era.
To borrow from Max Weber, Restatements float or sink on the
moving stream of judicial acceptance. The rules expressed in the Third
Restatement will either be validated as a material contribution to the
rationalization of this field by a swell of favorable references in judicial
opinions, or it will atrophy. Some, such as Guido Calabrese, have
suggested that the Third Restatement will not be successful. With
temerity, I think the great Yale scholar, and now federal judge, is in error.
As suggested earlier, no new treatment of products liability will overrun
judicial and statutory thinking as did the Second Restatement Section
402A. But in its introductory commentary, the ALI recognizes that habit
and acculturation may militate against abandonment of the classical
doctrinal labels, such as strict tort liability or negligence."' Even when
that proves true, the Third Restatement Reporters and the ALI agree, the
venerable doctrinal categories can coexist with the functional definitions
of manufacturing defects, design defects and warning/instructionsdefects.
And, when used as a means of evaluating products liability claims,
whether bonded with a doctrinal title or standing alone, the Third
112.476 U.S. 858 (1986).
113. Id. at 867.
1 14. Such tape, we might imagine, would besuitable for securing boxes containing quilts,

but a broken foot waiting to happen if used to secure a cast iron anvil.
115. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
I N T R O D U ~ O N(1998).
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Restatement, including its provisions for sellers of component parts, raw
materials and product ingredients,represents a work product satisfying the
highest and best purposes of the American Law Institute.
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